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THE PATCHWORK PROBLEM: A NEED FOR NATIONAL
UNIFORMITY TO ENSURE AN EQUITABLE PLAYING FIELD FOR
STUDENT-ATHLETES’ NAME, IMAGE, AND LIKENESS
COMPENSATION
Michael D. Fasciale*
“The arms race in intercollegiate athletics must stop.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Student-athlete2

compensation in the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA) has historically been limited to awarding academic
scholarships.3 Recently, many states have passed laws giving studentathletes the ability to monetize their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”).4
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Fairfield
University. I would like to thank Professor Brian Sheppard, the Seton Hall faculty, and
all the members of the Seton Hall Law Review for their constant help and guidance
throughout this writing process.
1 Supporting Our Intercollegiate Student-Athletes: Proposed NCAA Reform: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 10 (2004) (statement of Hon. C. Thomas McMillen).
2 Although the National Labor Relations Board seeks to classify “student-athletes”
as “employees,” this Comment will use the term “student-athletes” for consistency
purposes. See Gregg E. Clifton & Bernard G. Dennis III, NLRB’s General Counsel Uses
Prosecutorial Authority to Assert Student-Athletes Are Employees, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 1,
2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/nlrb-s-general-counsel-uses-prosecut
orial-authority-to-assert-student-athletes-are (arguing that “the term ‘student-athlete’
has a chilling effect that misleads student-athletes to believe [that] they are not entitled
to the [National Labor Relations Act’s] protection”).
3 See Scholarships, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, https://www.ncaa.org/studentathletes/future/scholarships (last visited Dec. 28, 2021) (noting that “[o]nly about [two
percent] of high school athletes are awarded athletics scholarships to compete in
college”).
4 An individual’s NIL makes up the legal concept known as the “right of publicity,”
or the right of the individual to control the commercial use of one’s identity. See Name,
Image and Likeness: What Student-Athletes Should Know, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/2020_NILresource_SA.pdf (last visited
Dec. 28, 2021). Examples of NIL-related activities include autographs, personal
appearances, business promotions, merchandise sales, video game representation, and
social media endorsements. Id.
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The growing patchwork of state legislation, however, invites
inconsistent application and interpretation of NIL laws. This gives rise
to an important question: is uniform federal legislative intervention the
answer?5 This Comment argues that it is.
First, without some form of national uniform NIL rights, studentathletes will likely only apply for admission at schools where NIL rights
are afforded. This consequence discourages a meaningful and
educational choice. National uniformity ensures that student-athletes
will enjoy more than simply the right to compete economically; it will
allow them to receive an education at the institution of their choice. In
uniformly promoting a meaningful and educational choice, federal
legislation will help student-athletes enjoy better opportunities, both
socially and financially, within the athletic industry as a whole.
Second, this state-by-state approach will—at a minimum—
severely impact the competitive balance within college sports. Because
student-athletes will be incentivized to attend schools in states with the
best regulatory environment for the player, power schools in states with
NIL laws will enjoy massive and unfair recruiting and transfer
advantages, thereby increasing the imbalances between the larger and
smaller markets. Already successful athletic programs will gain even
more advantages, as non-NIL states (or states with less desirable NIL
rules) may suffer due to less working capital to finance their educational
opportunities and to gain advantages for their students. The
hodgepodge of state laws will effectively steer the greatest future talent
toward a handful schools.
Third, although no court has explicitly addressed this issue, the
fractured state-by-state approach to NIL compensation may be
unconstitutional. In arguing against a state-by-state approach, the
NCAA could potentially rely on the Dormant Commerce Clause (“DCC”)
of the U.S. Constitution.6 The DCC is an implied restriction as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court that effectively
prevents states from passing laws that burden or discriminate against
interstate commerce.7 In relying on prior case law, the NCAA could
contend that the sheer number of intercollegiate schools subjected to

5 This is as opposed to judicial intervention.
See infra notes 173-180 and
accompanying text (discussing why judges should refrain from interfering with sports
associations’ internal affairs, absent exceptional circumstances).
6 See infra notes 86–96 and accompanying text (exploring this argument in detail).
7 See, e.g., Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (stating that the
“the [D]ormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about ‘economic
protectionism’—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic
interests by burdening out-of-state competitors”).
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inconsistent state laws could potentially interfere with a national
uniform governance structure, thereby unduly impacting or
discriminating against interstate commerce. In other words, this stateby-state approach could be placing certain states’ economic interests
(those that have NIL legislation) above out-of-states’ economic interests
(those that do not have NIL legislation), thus creating a competitive and
commercial advantage for certain student-athletes (i.e., is
discriminatory in purpose or effect). It remains to be seen whether the
conflicting state laws violate the DCC.
Fourth, despite their asserted aims, multiple state laws governing
NIL compensation are ambiguous and alarming. Based on the
differences in payment structures, effective dates, legal rights,
requirements regarding financial literacy, and ill-defined provisions
within each passed and proposed state bill, the welfare of studentathletes will not be uniformly protected. Navigating competing and
inconsistent state regulations will create confusion amongst athletes,
agents, and athletic departments nationwide.8
This Comment illustrates that the current athletic landscape and
patchwork of state laws governing NIL compensation requires federal
legislative intervention. Specifically, Part II addresses the history of the
NCAA, analyzes the NCAA’s slippery principle of amateurism, and
discusses how the NCAA has slowly begun to consider allowing studentathletes to benefit from their NIL. Part III considers the current
patchwork of state laws governing NIL compensation, studies how their
inconsistencies necessitate federal legislation, and examines the NCAA’s
reaction to a fractured state-by-state approach.
Part IV analyzes the currently proposed federal legislation
regarding NIL compensation. Finally, Part V concludes by arguing that,
although the attempt by some legislators to pass federal legislation is
headed in the right direction, more can—and must—be done. To
mitigate mass confusion, promote educational opportunities, and
pursue economic equity for student-athletes nationwide, Congress
should pass federal legislation, preempt competing state laws and
regulations, and restore uniformity throughout intercollegiate athletics.
Until then, states with NIL laws will compete vigorously for top talent,
and national uniformity in college sports and educational opportunities
will be severely undermined.

This Comment will not dissect each NIL state law that has been passed (or is in
the process of being passed); rather, it will analyze the representative components of
NIL state laws to demonstrate the inconsistencies which require federal legislation to
alleviate.
8
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II. NCAA BACKGROUND, AMATEURISM, AND MOMENTUM TOWARDS NIL
RIGHTS
This Part will (1) consider the NCAA’s background and show how
the NCAA has historically prevented student-athletes from earning
income on their NIL; (2) analyze the elusive principle of amateurism and
note how the NCAA’s primary argument revolves around giving studentathletes NIL rights to protect their amateur status; and (3) explore the
NCAA’s current stance regarding NIL and explain how and why the
NCAA was forced to act.
A. NCAA Background
The NCAA is a private, nonprofit association of approximately
1,098 members and 102 athletic conferences.9 This member-led
organization consists of colleges, universities, conferences, and
associations.10 It is “the largest and most prestigious association of
colleges and athletic conferences in the United States,” and holds a
“dominant position in intercollegiate athletics.”11
To retain
membership, NCAA members must abide by the NCAA’s
“Constitution,”12 of which its internal bylaws are voted upon by its
members.13 These bylaws, however, do not carry the force of law.14
Accordingly, the NCAA cannot prevent further state legislation
regarding NIL compensation, as its nationwide rulemaking authority
continues to be chipped away by the growing amount of state NIL laws.
Historically, the NCAA has prevented student-athletes from
earning income on their NIL.15 The reasoning, according to the NCAA, is
to protect student-athletes from “exploitation by professional and
9 What is the NCAA? NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/ncaa-101/what-ncaa (last visited Dec. 28, 2021).
10 Id.
11 Coll. Athletic Placement Serv., Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 74-1144,
1974 WL 998, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 1974); see also Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
746 F. Supp. 850, 852 (N.D. Ind. 1990), aff’d, 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
12 Bd. of Regents v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (W.D.
Okla. 1982).
13 Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 388
F.3d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the NCAA “adopts bylaws formulated by a
legislative body drawn from the Association’s membership”).
14 See Justin W. Aimonetti & Christian Talley, Game Changer: Why and How Congress
Should Preempt State Student-Athlete Compensation Regimes, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28,
34 (2019) ([“The NCAA’s] bylaws do not carry the force of law.”).
15 See, e.g., NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2020–21 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §§
12.4.2.3, 12.5.1.3, and 12.5.2.1, at 74, 75–76, 77 (2020), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/
reports/getReport/90008 [hereinafter 2020–2021 DIVISION I MANUAL].

FASCIALE (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

1/21/22 10:47 AM

COMMENT

903

commercial enterprises.”16 The NCAA has justified its opposition to NIL
rights and supported the concept of amateurism by (1) encouraging
competitiveness in college sports; (2) promoting education by
integrating academic and athletic goals; (3) incentivizing Division I
schools to remain a part of the NCAA; and (4) increasing consumer
demand.17
But many athlete advocates have vehemently opposed the NCAA’s
anti-NIL business model. Romogi Huma, the Executive Director of the
National College Players Association, stated that the NCAA has treated
its student-athletes like “disposable university property.”18 Senator
Steven Bradford, who co-sponsored the California NIL bill, likened the
situation to “institutionalized slavery.”19 And others have argued that
“absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely, and the NCAA’s [power]
has been absolute for half a century.”20 Many student-athletes agree.
For instance, a day before the 2021 NCAA March Madness Basketball
Tournament began, many college athletes took to social media and
pushed for NCAA reform using the hashtag “NotNCAAProperty.”21
B. The Principle of Amateurism
The NCAA has primarily opposed giving student-athletes NIL rights
to protect their amateur status. Allowing student-athletes to profit from
their NIL, the argument goes, would repel fans.22 Often referred to as

2020–2021 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 2.9, at 3.
See Michael McCann, Name Image and Likeness: A Guide on College Athlete
Compensation, SPORTICO (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.sportico.com/feature/collegeathletes-paid-name-image-likeness-deals-nils-1234616329/.
18 NCAA Refusal to Vote on NIL Pay is ‘Slap in the Face’ to Athletes, NAT’L COLLEGE
PLAYERS ASS’N (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.ncpanow.org/news/releases-advisories/
ncaa-refusal-to-vote-on-nil-pay-is-slap-in-the-face-to-athletes.
19 See Gregg E. Clifton, California Senators to Introduce Supplement to SB 206 in
Advance of NCAA’s January Name, Image, and Likeness Vote, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-senators-to-introduce-supplementto-sb-206-advance-ncaa-s-january-name.
20 Ivan Solotaroff, The Athlete Advocate, SB NATION (Apr. 23, 2014), https://
www.sbnation.com/longform/2014/4/23/5640402/the-athlete-advocate-ramogihuma.
21 See, e.g., Geo Baker (@Geo_Baker_1), TWITTER (Mar. 17, 2021, 1:42 PM), https://
twitter.com/Geo_Baker_1/status/1372241981150220290?s=20; McKenzie Milton
(@McKenzieMil10), TWITTER (Apr. 29, 2021, 12:59 AM), https://twitter.com/
McKenzieMil10/status/1387632668146163715.
22 Michael McCann, Name, Image and Likeness: A Guide on College Athlete
Compensation, SPORTICO (Nov. 11, 2020), https://www.sportico.com/feature/collegeathletes-paid-name-image-likeness-deals-nils-1234616329/.
16
17
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the “principle of amateurism,” this slippery principle23 states that
“[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and
their participation in sports should be motivated primarily by education
and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived.”24 Thus,
the NCAA’s amateurism principle has attempted to “retain a clear line of
demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports”
in order for college athletics to remain “an integral part of the
educational program.”25
Initially, courts endorsed the NCAA’s definition of amateurism. In
Jones v. NCAA, for example, the court held that the NCAA was allowed to
declare an ice hockey player ineligible to play intercollegiate ice hockey
due to his violation of amateurism rules.26 Fifteen years later, in Gaines
v. NCAA, the court held that the “public interest is promoted by
preserving amateurism.”27 And in McCormack v. NCAA, the Fifth Circuit
held that the NCAA’s amateurism requirements “reasonably
further[ed]” the NCAA’s goals of integrating athletics with academics.28
Recent litigation, however, has challenged this nebulous concept.29
After seeing an avatar of himself in an officially licensed NCAA video
game, Ed O’Bannon—a former All-American UCLA basketball player and
retired National Basketball Association player—sued the NCAA,30
arguing that the NCAA’s rules violated the Sherman Antitrust Act.31
23 See Ivan Maisel, The NCAA Must Again Put Athletes First, This Time Around the NIL
Debate, ESPN (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/
29083196/the-ncaa-again-put-athletes-first-nil-debate (describing the amateurism
principle as, “at best, a beau ideal,” and recognizing that, “[w]hen convenient,
amateurism has been held as the standard. And when the sham has become too obvious
to ignore, the NCAA simply has changed its definition of amateurism to bring it closer to
the actual behavior of its coaches and players.”); see also Taylor Branch, The Shame of
College Sports, ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/
2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/ (criticizing the “noble principles [of
amateurism and the student-athlete] on which the NCAA justifies its existence,”
classifying them as “cynical hoaxes” and “legalistic conductions”).
24 2020–2021 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 15, § 2.9, at 3.
25 Id. § 1.3.1, at 1.
26 392 F. Supp. 295, 304 (D. Mass. 1975).
27 746 F. Supp. 738, 747 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
28 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988).
29 See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the
NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 61, 70
(2013) (arguing that the principle of amateurism violates the Sherman Antitrust Act).
30 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015).
31 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018) (outlawing “every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States . . . .”).
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O’Bannon neither consented to nor received compensation for the use
of his NIL.32 Under a three-step framework of the antitrust “rule of
reason” test,33 Judge Bybee found that the NCAA’s prevention of NIL
compensation in various markets34 constituted a commercial restraint
on trade, thus violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.35
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the NCAA’s rules [had]
been more restrictive than necessary [in this case] to maintain its
tradition of amateurism,” but it nevertheless held that preserving
amateurism had procompetitive benefits, and distinguished between
payments tied to educationally-related activities and those unrelated.36
Thus, O’Bannon established that future student-athletes “can use federal
antitrust law to attempt to ‘prove’ that there are better ways of
preserving amateurism than current NCAA rules.”37 In the wake of
O’Bannon, however, one thing remains certain: as more states continue
to pass laws governing student-athletes’ NIL compensation, the NCAA’s
ability to uphold its amateurism principle erodes in tandem.38
C. A Plea to Congress: The NCAA’s Shift in Position
In light of recent and robust legal and legislative activity, coupled
with its associated and mounting pressures to afford student-athletes

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
Under this test, “[t]he plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within a relevant market,” and if
the plaintiff demonstrates this, the burden shifts to the defendant to “come forward with
evidence of the restraint’s procompetitive effects.” If the defendant meets this burden,
the plaintiff “must then show that any legitimate objectives can be achieved in a
substantially less restrictive manner.” O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070 (citing Tanaka v.
Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th. Cir. 2001)).
34 These markets include live game telecasts, sports video games, and game
rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other archival footage. See O’Bannon v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
35 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1053.
36 Id. at 1079.
37 FED. AND STATE LEGIS. WORKING GRP., NCAA BD. OF GOVERNORS, FINAL REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 29 (2020), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/ncaa/
wrkgrps/fslwg/Apr2020FSLWG_Report.pdf
[hereinafter
WORKING
GROUP
RECOMMENDATIONS].
38 In February 2021, EA Sports (a division of Electronic Arts Inc.) announced that it
will revive its college football video games series—a series that was stopped because of
O’Bannon’s NIL controversy. See Mike Hume & Rick Maese, EA Sports Revives College
Football Franchise as Courts Mull NCAA’s Stance on Amateurism, WASH. POST (Feb. 2, 2021,
12:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/video-games/2021/02/02/ea-sportscollege-football/.
32
33
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NIL rights, the NCAA was forced to act.39 The NCAA tasked the Federal
and State Legislation Working Group (“Working Group”) with exploring
solutions for NIL compensation issues.40 Nearly a year after its
inception, the Working Group proposed to the NCAA Board of Governors
certain changes to the NCAA bylaws, which would allow studentathletes to profit from use of their NIL in ways both related and
unrelated to athletics.41
Although this seemed promising for student-athletes, the Working
Group’s recommendations were more restrictive in relation to state NIL
laws.42 For example, the Working Group recommended that the NCAA
should stress that “any modernization of [the NCAA’s] NIL bylaws must
be accompanied by guardrails.”43 Unfortunately, these guardrails were
vague, did not adequately address NIL compensation issues, and
continued to severely restrict opportunities for student-athletes to earn
income on their NIL.
The NCAA has historically placed a shadow of uncertainty over any
negotiation for compensation that might benefit student-athletes.44
While this might stifle students’ attempts to gain compensation, it could
also place the student-athlete in financial peril because it is equally
possible that it will lead to unfair deals. The possibility that a university
could exercise its discretion to force a student out of a deal could not
only make it more difficult for students to retain agents, but it would
also weaken students’ leverage in setting favorable contractual terms.
This, in turn, could place students at risk of exploitation or downstream
breach claims.
On November 13, 2020, the NCAA Division I Council submitted
proposed amendments regarding student-athletes’ NIL rights.
According to one proposed NCAA bylaw, “[a]n institution, at its
39 Board of Governors Starts Process to Enhance Name, Image and Likeness
Opportunities, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Oct. 29, 2019), http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/media-center/news/board-governors-starts-process-enhance-nameimage-and-likeness-opportunities.
40 WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 37, at 1.
41 Id. at 21–25.
42 See Dan Murphy, NCAA Group Supports Player Endorsement Plan, ESPN (Apr. 29,
2020), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29112263/ncaa-group-oksconditional-player-endorsements (noting that the “NCAA’s proposal remains more
restrictive than the state laws and proposed laws,” as “[t]hose differences could lead to
a legal conflict . . . .”).
43 WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 37, at 1–2.
44 See generally Jon Solomon, The History Behind the Debate Over Paying NCAA
Athletes, ASPEN INST. (Apr. 23, 2018), aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/history-behinddebate-paying-ncaa-athletes/.
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discretion, [would be able to] prohibit a student-athlete’s involvement
in name, image, and likeness activities [while they are actively
participating in collegiate sports] based on other considerations, such
as conflict with institutional values, as defined by the institution.”45 But
“institutional values” is an inherently subjective concept defined by the
particular school. Darren Heitner, a sports lawyer and NIL advocate,
noted that if this were to occur, the NCAA would effectively be creating
the opposite of a free market.46 “[W]ithout a uniform set of objective
values,” Heitner argued, “there should be fear of the values changing
whenever it suits the university.”47
The NCAA acknowledges this unfortunate reality. Mark Emmert,
President of the NCAA, stressed the need for federal legislation to
achieve uniformity in athletic compensation.48 To achieve consistency,
the NCAA presented Congress with a summary of proposed NIL
legislation. The bill—The Intercollegiate Amateur Sports Act of 2020—
has not, and should not, become law for three reasons: (1) it is utterly
brazen, overly restrictive, and one-sided; (2) it imposes a blanket
antitrust exemption from lawsuits; and (3) it provides the NCAA with
full control to craft all rules on student-athlete compensation and NIL
legislation.49 To be sure, the NCAA’s interests are important; but federal
lawmakers should nevertheless enact legislation that also protects
NCAA student-athletes—political accountability and unbiased
treatment of all interests is required.

Amateurism—Use of Name, Image and Likeness—Student-Athletes, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (2020), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/proposal
View?id=105566 (emphasis added).
46 Darren Heitner, The NCAA’s Proposed Name, Image, And Likeness (NIL) Legislation
Fails College Athletes, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 16, 2020, 11:17 AM), https://
abovethelaw.com/2020/11/the-ncaas-proposed-name-image-and-likeness-nillegislation-fails-college-athletes.
47 Id.
48 Name, Image, and Likeness: The State of Intercollegiate Athletic Compensation:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Mfg., Trade, and Consumer Prot., 116th Cong. 6 (2020)
(statement of Dr. Mark Emmert, President, National Collegiate Athletic Association),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/A3E515B6-A2A3-4453-BB32DE37F4D72FB5; see also Questions and Answers on Name, Image, and Likeness, NAT’L
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (Apr. 28, 2020), http://www.ncaa.org/questions-andanswers-name-image-and-likeness (The NCAA considers it “critical that college sports
are regulated at a national level” in order to ensure “the uniformity of rules and a level
playing field for student-athletes.”).
49 See Ross Dellenger, NCAA Presents Congress with Bold Proposal for NIL Legislation,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 31, 2020), https://www.si.com/college/2020/07/31/ncaasends-congress-nil-legislation-proposal#&gid=ci026b661b40002686&pid=ncaa-nildraft-language.
45
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On June 30, 2021, all three NCAA divisions adopted a uniform,
interim policy that suspended the NCAA’s NIL rules prohibiting athletes
from monetizing their NIL.50 Although facially promising, this interim
policy is yet another example of why uniform federal legislation is
needed. Under the interim policy, some opportunities will be restricted,
but the types of restrictions will vary based on state laws and policies
created by individual schools. Schools in states that have NIL laws, for
example, are instructed to follow that state’s NIL law when determining
what their student-athletes can do. But the NCAA instructed schools in
states without NIL laws to “create and publish their own policies to
provide clarity to the gray area and come up with a plan to resolve any
disputes that arise.”51
The interim policy, therefore, is simply a stopgap measure which
will remain in effect until federal legislation is passed or new NCAA rules
are adopted.52 The ramifications stemming from this policy will likely
increase the patchwork of state NIL laws by forcing states without NIL
laws to catch up so as to not be left behind. This exerts an additional
burden on athletic departments within each state to ensure that
student-athletes are fully informed about the complex and different
policies that must be complied with in terms of exploiting their NIL.
III. THE PASSAGE OF STATE LAWS, THEIR INCOMPATIBILITY, AND POTENTIAL
INVALIDATION
This Part will (1) introduce why a patchwork of state laws
governing NIL compensation is problematic; (2) examine the current
balkanization of NIL state laws; and (3) analyze whether these varying
NIL state laws pass muster under the DCC. As of September 20, 2021,
twenty-two states passed NIL laws, while seven other states enacted NIL
laws that go into effect between 2022 and 2025.53 It is possible, if not
probable, that many more states will continue to draft and propose NIL

50 Taking Action: Name, Image and Likeness, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (June 30,
2021), https://www.ncaa.org/about/taking-action; see also Dan Murphy, NCAA Clears
Student-Athletes to Pursue Name, Image and Likeness Deals, ESPN (June 30, 2021),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/31737039/ncaa-clears-studentathletes-pursue-name-image-likeness-deals (“The NCAA’s board of directors decided . . .
to officially suspend the organization’s rules prohibiting athletes from selling the rights
to their names, images and likenesses.”).
51 Murphy, supra note 50.
52 See id.
53 See Thomas Di Biasio, Most States Pass “Name, Image, and Likeness” Laws for
Student Athletes, MULTISTATE (Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.multistate.us/insider/
2021/9/21/most-states-pass-name-image-and-likeness-laws-for-student-athletes.
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bills unless Congress solidifies a uniform plan.54 While the general
structure of the passed and proposed bills are similar, some of the
provisions are ill-defined and could confuse athletic departments.
A. Passage of State Laws: The Patchwork Problem
Advocating for evenness nationally, the NCAA contends that if
schools are governed by different NIL laws, this would “gravely
undermine the ability of the NCAA’s members to achieve their shared
goal of fair competition within their divisions.”55 But this NIL
conundrum is not solely about economic competitiveness within a
capitalistic society. If this were only about money—and particularly if
it were only about providing student-athletes with the ability to profit
financially—the NCAA would not support it as strongly as it has been.
Without some form of national uniform NIL rights, student-athletes will
likely only apply for admission in schools where NIL rights are afforded.
This consequence discourages athletes from making a meaningful
choice when selecting their school.
But if student-athletes are given the ability to apply to schools in
any state (because federal NIL rights would exist), then such uniformity
promotes educational opportunities. Thus, the NCAA—and this
Comment—supports national uniformity to ensure that students can
not only enjoy more than simply the right to compete economically but
also to receive an education at the institution of their choice. In allowing
them to monetize their NIL through federal legislation, student-athletes
will enjoy better opportunities within the athletic industry as a whole,
compete on an equal playing field, and grow educationally, socially, and
financially.
States are passing NIL laws for three primary reasons: (1) studentathletes in non-NIL states (or states with less desirable NIL rules) are
deprived of money, opportunities, and advantage; (2) there is bipartisan
support for the idea that student-athletes are being commercially
exploited through their inability to capitalize on their NIL;56 and (3)
lawmakers do not want other states to enjoy recruiting advantages,

54 See, e.g., Ross Dellenger, Iowa Becomes Latest State to Introduce Athlete NIL Bill;
Targeting July 1 Effective Date, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.si.com/
college/2021/02/03/iowa-name-image-likeness-bill-ncaa (noting how Senator Nate
Boulton introduced the Iowa NIL bill because he “want[ed] to make sure [that] no Iowa
athlete [was] left behind”).
55 WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 37, at 28.
56 See, e.g., Patrick Hruby, How Fighting the NCAA Became a Bipartisan Sport, WASH.
POST MAG. (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/magazine/2020/03/
17/how-fighting-ncaa-became-bipartisan-sport/?arc404=true.
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thereby losing potential recruits to states where student-athletes have
the right to profit on their NIL.
Because student-athletes will be incentivized to attend schools in
states with the best regulatory environment for the player, power
schools57 in states with NIL laws could enjoy massive and unfair
recruiting advantages.58 Not only would this increase the imbalances
between the larger and smaller markets, but it may inevitably create
confusion amongst athletes and agents navigating the competing and
inconsistent state regulations. Therefore, already successful athletic
programs could gain even more advantages, as non-NIL states, or states
with less desirable NIL rules, may suffer due to less working capital to
finance educational opportunities and advantages for their students.
Until federal legislation is enacted, this state-by-state approach will—at
a minimum—severely impact the competitive balance within college
sports.
B. Unfair Competition: The Current Balkanization of NIL State
Laws
This Section will not dissect each NIL state law that has been
enacted (or is in the process of being passed); rather, it will analyze the
representative components of certain NIL state laws to demonstrate the
inconsistencies which require federal legislation to alleviate. Based on
the differences in payment structures, effective dates, legal rights, and
requirements of financial literacy,59 the welfare of student-athletes will
not be uniformly protected without federal intervention. Navigating illdefined and inconsistent state regulations will create confusion among
athletes, agents, and athletic departments nationwide.

57 See American Football: Sarah Fuller Makes History as First Woman in a Power 5
Game, BBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada55115661 (noting that the Power Five refers to five athletic conferences which are
considered to be the elite in collegiate football. The Power Five conferences are the
Atlantic Coast Conference, Big Ten Conference, Big 12 Conference, Pac-12 Conference,
and Southeastern Conference.).
58 See Andrew Weiss, The California Fair Pay to Play Act: A Survey of the Regulatory
and Business Impacts of a State-Based Approach to Compensating College Athletes and the
Challenges Ahead, 16 RUTGERS BUS. L.J. 259, 289 (2020) (addressing the potential
recruiting problems associated with schools in states with NIL laws, as compared to
states without NIL laws).
59 See Zachary Zagger, 4 Key Issues as States Tackle College Athlete Pay, LAW360 (Oct.
9, 2020, 4:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/california/articles/1318247?copied=1
(describing four key issues that states must confront in tackling student-athlete NIL
compensation issues).
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California Senate Bill 206, commonly referred to as the Fair Pay to
Play Act60 (“California Bill”), prohibits any postsecondary educational
institution from hindering student-athletes from capitalizing on their
NIL.61 Although the California Bill is advancing NIL rights, it is not
perfect. The California Bill, which took effect on September 1, 2021,
prevents the NCAA from precluding universities, or any organization
with authority over intercollegiate athletics, from participating in
intercollegiate athletics as a result of a student-athlete’s use of their
NIL.62 The California Bill allows a student-athlete to earn compensation
from their NIL, but it does not define compensation or provide further
context for the term.63
In addition, the California Bill allows student-athletes to hire
agents to represent them in negotiation matters and business
opportunities, so long as those endorsement deals are not in conflict
with the athlete’s team contract.64 This is a seismic change from the
current landscape. Because competing for high-profile players is a
difficult task—especially in California’s competitive sports market—it is
plausible that agents will begin recruiting elite players during the early
stages of their career, such as high school. Agents in California,
therefore, will likely feel pressure to intervene early in a studentathlete’s career, because if they fail to do so, they might miss the
opportunity of representing the same player at the professional level.
And athletes under eighteen are continuously and increasingly the
targets of solicitation; subjecting fifteen-year-old student-athletes to
agents might do more harm than good.65

60 S.B. 206, Collegiate Athletics: Student Athlete Compensation and Representation,
383 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
61 S.B. 206 § 2(a)(2).
62 S.B. 206 § 2(a)(3).
63 Compare S.B. 206 (not defining compensation), with S.B. 20-123, 72nd Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Colo. 2020) (defining compensation as “money or other
remuneration or thing of value given to a student athlete in exchange for the use of the
student athlete’s name, image, or likeness” and “[d]oes not include a scholarship from
the institution at which a student athlete is enrolled that provides the student athlete all
or a portion of the cost of attendance at that institution”), and L.B. 962, 106th Leg., 2d
Sess. § 1 (Neb. 2020) (defining compensation as “consideration received pursuant to an
endorsement contract”).
64 See S.B. 206, § 2(c)(1), (e)(1) (describing the terms of the California Bill).
65 See generally Lee Green, Impact of California’s ‘Fair Pay to Play Act’ On High School
Athletes, NAT’L FED’N OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASS’N (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://www.nfhs.org/articles/impact-of-california-s-fair-pay-to-play-act-on-highschool-athletes/ (discussing the ramifications of the California Bill on high school
athletes).
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Florida Senate Bill 646, known as the Intercollegiate Athlete
Compensation and Rights Bill66 (“Florida Bill”), took effect on July 1,
2021. The Florida Bill currently allows student-athletes to enter into
contracts to license their NIL while participating in intercollegiate
athletics.67
The Florida Bill permits sixty-four postsecondary
educational institutions68 in Florida to be subjected to different rules
than states throughout the entire country, further dividing the gap
among rights afforded to amateur athletes nationwide. It is also the only
state bill thus far that includes an educational component, requiring
schools to “conduct a financial literacy and life skills workshop for a
minimum of [five] hours at the beginning of the intercollegiate athlete’s
first and third academic years.”69 The Florida Bill, unlike the California
Bill, applies to community colleges.70
The Florida Bill also provides that an intercollegiate athlete may
not enter into a contract for compensation for the use of the studentathlete’s NIL if a term of the contract conflicts with a term of the
intercollegiate athlete’s “team contract.” But the term “team contract”
is not defined in the bill.71 It also states that compensation “may only be
provided by a third-party unaffiliated with” the athlete’s school and that
the compensation be “commensurate with the market value of the
authorized use of the athlete’s name, image, or likeness.”72 Again, the
terms “unaffiliated” or “commensurate with the market value” are not
defined in the Florida Bill. Therefore, although compensation usually
means monetary compensation, it is plausible to interpret the term
compensation in this context to “allow non-monetary compensation to
be deemed compensation so long as it is commensurate with market
value.”73
New Jersey Senate Bill 971, known as the New Jersey Fair Play Act
(“New Jersey Bill”), will not take effect until 2025.74 Notably, the New
S.B. 646, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2020).
§ 1006.74(2)(a).
68 See § 1006.74(1)(c). Florida defines a postsecondary educational institution as “a
state university, a Florida College System institution, or a private college or university
receiving aid under chapter 1009.”
69 § 1006.74(2)(k).
70 § 1006.74(1)(c).
71 § 1006.74(1).
72 § 1006.74(2)(a).
73 Bob Wallace, Jr. & Matthew Misichko, A Look at Recent Student Athlete Name,
Image and Likeness Legislation, THOMPSON COBURN LLP (July 7, 2020), https://
www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/publications/item/2020-07-07/a-look-atrecent-student-athlete-name-image-and-likeness-legislation.
74 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3B-86–89 (West 2020).
66
67
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Jersey Bill prohibits student-athletes from earning NIL compensation in
connection with “adult entertainment products and services; alcohol
products; casinos and gambling, including sports betting, the lottery,
and betting in connection with video games, on-line games, and mobile
devices; tobacco and electronic smoking products and devices;
pharmaceuticals; a controlled dangerous substance; and weapons,
including firearms and ammunition.”75 The New Jersey Bill prohibits
postsecondary institutions from “upholding any rule, requirement,
standard, or other limitation that prevents college athletes from
monetizing their [NIL].”76
Nebraska Legislative Bill 962, known as the Nebraska Fair Pay to
Play Act (“Nebraska Bill”), does not take effect until July 1, 2023, but it
states that “each postsecondary institution shall determine a date on or
before” that date to start implementing the new law.77 Although it has
yet to happen, schools in Nebraska78 could allow student-athletes to
receive NIL compensation as of the date this Comment was written. The
Nebraska Bill is silent as to whether schools can pay student-athletes
(unlike the other state laws that explicitly state that schools cannot do
so), leaving open the possibility that Nebraska schools themselves could
potentially pay the student-athletes through endorsement deals.
Colorado Senate Bill 20-12379 (“Colorado Bill”) takes effect January
1, 2023.80 Both the Colorado Bill and the Nebraska Bill—unlike the
California Bill, the New Jersey Bill, and the Florida Bill—allow “athletes
to sue schools, conferences, or the NCAA if their new rights under the
law are violated.”81 The Colorado Bill allows a student-athlete
“aggrieved by an action taken by an institution or an athletic association
in violation of this part [to] bring an action for injunctive relief.”82 In
contrast, Nebraska’s bill allows student-athletes “aggrieved by a
violation” to “bring a civil action against the postsecondary institution

§ 18A:3B-87(2)(b).
Gregg E. Clifton & Nicholas A. Plinio, New Jersey Grants Name, Image, Likeness
Rights to Collegiate Student-Athletes, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 15, 2020), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/new-jersey-grants-name-image-likeness-rights-tocollegiate-student-athletes.
77 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48:3609 (2020).
78 This includes the Big Ten Conference, which is the oldest Division I collegiate
conference in the NCAA.
79 COLO. REV. STAT. § 23-16-301 (2020).
80 S.B. 20-123, 72nd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 2.
81 Zagger, supra note 59.
82 § 23-16-301(6)(b).
75
76
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or collegiate athletic association committing such violation.”83 That is,
Colorado’s private right of action is reduced to seeking “injunctive
relief,”84 while Nebraska’s bill allows student-athletes to seek “actual
damages,” “preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief,” and
“[r]easonable attorney’s fees and other litigation costs.”85
Ultimately, the growing number of state laws governing NIL
compensation, despite their asserted aims, is ambiguous and alarming.
Based on the differences in payment structures, effective dates, legal
rights, and requirements of financial literacy, the welfare of studentathletes will not be uniformly protected without congressional
intervention.
C. Worthy of Constitutional Protection? Potential Invalidation of
State Laws Under the DCC
The U.S. Constitution expressly permits the federal government to
regulate commerce among the states.86 The DCC, by contrast, is an
implied restriction in the U.S. Constitution that effectively prevents
states from passing laws that burden or discriminate against interstate
commerce.87 Relying on favorable case precedent and the DCC, the
NCAA could argue that the sheer number of intercollegiate schools
subjected to inconsistent state laws interferes with a national uniform
governance structure and thus unduly impacts or discriminates against
interstate commerce (i.e., violates the DCC).88
The Supreme Court has adopted a two-tier approach in analyzing a
DCC challenge.89 First, if the statute “directly regulates or discriminates
against interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state
economic interests over out-of-state interests,” federal courts will strike

NEB. REV. STAT. § 48:3608(1) (2020).
§ 23-16-301(6)(b).
85 § 48:3608(2).
86 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
87 See Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (stating that the “the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about ‘economic protectionism—that
is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors’”).
88 See also Michael Fasciale, Is a Patchwork of State NIL Laws Unconstitutional?,
CONDUCT DETRIMENTAL (Oct. 5, 2021), https://www.conductdetrimental.com/post/is-apatchwork-of-state-nil-laws-unconstitutional.
89 See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986); see also Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 151 F. Supp. 2d 526, 537 (D.N.J.
2001).
83
84
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down the law without further inquiry.90 Second, where the statute
“regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”91
As to the first prong, the NCAA could argue that the state-by-state
approach to NIL compensation puts certain states’ economic interests
(those which have NIL legislation) above out-of-states’ economic
interests (those which do not have NIL legislation), thus creating a
competitive and commercial advantage for certain student-athletes (i.e.,
is discriminatory in purpose or effect). In response, one could argue that
each state NIL law does not discriminate against interstate commerce
because each state’s NIL law does not inject its regulatory scheme into
the jurisdiction of other states. For example, as written, California’s NIL
statute—like many other state NIL laws—is directed only towards
conduct within California and applies to in-state and out-of-state
entities alike.
In arguing that a patchwork of state NIL laws directly regulates or
discriminates against interstate commerce, the NCAA could potentially
rely on favorable case precedent like NCAA v. Miller. There, the Nevada
state legislature enacted a statute that required the NCAA to provide
student-athletes “accused of a rules infraction with certain procedural
due process protections during an enforcement proceeding.”92 The
Ninth Circuit held that Nevada’s statute violated the DCC because it
impermissibly regulated interstate commerce.93
However, the NCAA might have difficulty relying on Miller. The
“critical inquiry,” the Ninth Circuit explained, is whether “the practical
effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of
the State.”94 That is precisely what the Nevada law did in Miller—
Nevada was telling the NCAA how to conduct a hearing and, in doing so,

90 Distillers Corp, 476 U.S. at 579 (emphasis added). This, of course, is subject to the
Virtual Per Se Rule of Invalidity, which leaves open the possibility that some such laws
might still pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148–52
(1986) (validating a law that banned the importation of out of state fish because the
state had a legitimate purpose of protecting its waters from invasive/non-native species
of fish and the court found no other non-discriminatory means for achieving that
interest).
91 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
92 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 637 (9th. Cir. 1993).
93 Id. at 640.
94 Id. at 639 (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
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intruded on an interstate organization.95 But here, the states with NIL
laws are telling the universities within their states how to treat their
student-athletes. Hence, they do not require the NCAA to do anything,
and each state law is directed towards conduct within each individual
state (and treats in-state and out-of-state entities alike).
As to the second prong, the NCAA could argue that student-athletes
will be incentivized to attend schools in states with NIL laws, effectively
steering the greatest future talent toward a handful of schools. This
competitive advantage, the argument goes, harms the overall
intercollegiate athletic landscape because the NCAA’s NIL business
model requires uniformity. In response, one could argue that the
burdens associated with the patchwork of state NIL laws (i.e., potential
recruiting advantages) are small in connection with the purported
benefits (i.e., the protection of student-athletes). Importantly, the
majority of student-athletes who attend schools in states with NIL
statutes will not profit extensively by marketing their NIL; rather, the
minority of student-athletes will negotiate meaningful and moneymaking endorsement deals. Thus, the burdens associated with the
patchwork of state NIL laws would not be “clearly excessive” in relation
to the state’s legitimate interest in protecting student-athletes.
It also could be argued that NIL compensation effectively means
extraterritorial regulation.96 Under this theory, once one state allows
NIL compensation, all other schools in other states would likely feel
obligated to follow suit. In other words, if State A allows its studentathletes to be paid, then other schools in State B will likely have to start
offering payments as well in order to compete with State A when it
comes to recruiting. Nevertheless, the mounting uncertainty as to
whether a hodgepodge of state laws is unconstitutional further
demonstrates the need for federal intervention.
In sum, the NCAA will face an uphill battle in court if it pursues the
“state NIL laws violate the DCC” argument. Note that the DCC only
applies where Congress has not explicitly authorized the states to pass
laws of this type—in other words, Congress can override the DCC’s
limits. Until Congress acts, however, it remains to be seen whether
conflicting state laws violate the DCC.
95 Id. at 641 (“[w]e appreciate Nevada’s interest in assuring that its citizens and
institutions will be treated fairly. However, the authority it seeks here goes to the heart
of the NCAA and threatens to tear that heart out.”).
96 See Susan Lorde Martin, The Extraterritoriality Doctrine of the Dormant Commerce
Clause is Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497, 501 (2016) (noting that the extraterritorial
doctrine “applies when a state regulates conduct that is wholly outside its own borders
and . . . unconstitutionality does not depend on the regulation’s discriminating against
out-of-staters”); see also Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (defining extraterritoriality).

FASCIALE (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

1/21/22 10:47 AM

COMMENT

917

IV. PENDING FEDERAL LEGISLATION REGARDING NIL COMPENSATION
In its plea to Congress to enact federal legislation, the NCAA
contended that the patchwork of state laws “would adversely impact the
competitive balance that currently exists in college sports.”97 A federal
law, however, would resolve this concern by eliminating any
competitive and commercial advantages over schools in non-NIL
states.98 In addition to legislation proposed by the NCAA, which fails to
account fairly for student-athlete’s interests, there have been seven
separate federal bill proposals (with additional ones expected in the
foreseeable future).99 Like the preceding Section, this Part will only
analyze the ramifications of the most recent NIL federal bills.100
A. Positive Progress: Student-Athlete Equity Act
Congressman Mark Walker’s bill, known as the Student-Athlete
Equity Act (“Equity Act”), was the first federal bill proposed.101 The
Equity Act primarily aims to “amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
to prohibit qualified amateur sports organizations from prohibiting or
substantially restricting the use of an athlete’s name, image, or
likeness.”102 To date, § 501(j)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts
from federal taxation “any organization organized and operated
exclusively to foster national or international amateur sports
competition if such organization is also organized and operated
primarily to conduct national or international competition in sports or

See Dellenger, supra note 49.
See Michael McCann, California’s New Law Worries the NCAA, But a Federal Law is
What They Should Fear, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.si.com/
college/2019/10/04/ncaa-fair-pay-to-play-act-name-likeness-image-laws (noting that,
if a federal law is passed, the “NCAA could not credibly argue that multiple states are
forcing it into a confused and conflicting set of rules,” and no state “would . . . gain[] a
competitive advantage in recruiting”).
99 NIL Legislation Tracker, SAUL, EWING, ARNSTEIN, & LEHR, LLP, https://
www.saul.com/nil-legislation-tracker#3.
100 This Part will not address Senator Roger Wicker’s federal proposal (The College
Athlete and Compensatory Rights Act); Senator Christopher Murphy’s federal proposal
(The College Athlete Economic Freedom Act); Senator Jerry Moran’s federal proposal
(The Amateur Athletes Protection and Compensation Act of 2021); Senators
Christopher Murphy’s and Bernie Sanders’ federal proposal (The College Athlete Right
to Organize Act); and any other bills that were proposed after September 22, 2021.
101 Student-Athlete Equity Act, H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. (2019).
102 Id.
97
98
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to support and develop amateur athletes for national or international
competition in sports.”103
The Equity Act, therefore, would make § 501(j)(2)’s tax exemption
unavailable to “[any] organization that substantially restricts a
[student-athlete] from using, or being reasonably compensated for the
third-party use of, [their] name, image, or likeness.”104 In effect, it would
“strip the NCAA of its nonprofit tax status if the association [did not]
allow its athletes to have the full use of their NIL rights.”105 In other
words, it forces the NCAA to choose between “pay[ing] significantly
more in taxes or allow[ing] student-athletes to earn NIL
compensation.”106
B. (No) Power to the Players: Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act
A second federal proposal, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio’s Fairness in
Collegiate Athletics Act (the “Rubio Bill”), aims to “ensure that college
athletes, and not institutions of higher education, are able to profit on
their name, image, and likeness.”107 Senator Rubio believes the NCAA
must write national standards—not Congress.108 Accordingly, under
the Rubio Bill, if the NCAA failed to develop a design by June 30, 2021,109
the Federal Trade Commission would have enforcement powers.110
Because all three NCAA divisions adopted an interim policy on June 30,
2021 that suspended the NCAA’s NIL rules prohibiting athletes from
103 I.R.C. § 501(j)(2); see also NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND
SUBSIDIARIES: CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE YEARS ENDED AUGUST 31,
2018 AND 2017, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION FOR THE YEAR ENDED AUGUST 31, 2018, AND
INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 4 (2018), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/
finance/2017-18NCAAFin_NCAAFinancialStatement.pdf (stating that the NCAA’s
annual revenue from 2017-2018 topped one billion dollars in revenue, most of which
came from television and marketing rights fees, and championships and NIT
tournaments). Per § 501(j)(2), however, the NCAA was not obligated to pay federal
taxes in any amount.
104 Student-Athlete Equity Act, H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. § 2(a) (2019).
105 Dan Murphy, Can Congress Help the NCAA Find NIL Consistency?, ESPN (July 1,
2020),
https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29392144/congressworking-multiple-legislative-options-solve-ncaa-nil-issue.
106 Brandon Beyer, Federal Legislation Still Has a Role to Play in the Fight for StudentAthlete Compensation, 46 J. LEGIS. 303, 312 (2019).
107 Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act of 2020, S. 4004, 116th Cong. (2020) (flush
language).
108 OutKick, Marco Rubio Joined Clay to Discuss Sport and His Name, Image, and
Likeness Bill, YOUTUBE (June 18, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
hH1eXhcA9Rc.
109 S. 4004, § 3.
110 Id. § 4(a)(2).
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monetizing their NIL, this provision is likely moot.111 The Rubio Bill also
contains an express preemption provision that is critical to achieve
economic equity and uniformity for student-athletes nationwide.112
But the Rubio Bill is problematic. First, it is extremely NCAAfriendly and fails to put the student-athlete first. It reads as if it was
created to solve the problem for the NCAA—not for studentathletes113—thus allowing the NCAA to further “enshrine its own
definition of amateurism”114 while providing “considerable leeway to
determine what types of opportunities would be available to its
athletes.”115
Second, it does not protect all student-athletes’
employment rights—only those that participate in NCAA programs.116
Commenters argue that the bill “undermines economic freedom, states’
rights, and gives the NCAA immunity for illegal activities.”117 Third, the
bill (rather paradoxically) would “open the door for NIL pay, but it
would also give the NCAA, conferences and schools protection from all
causes of action ‘in any court’ regarding the adoption of rules around
such a system.”118 In effect, the bill insulates the NCAA from both
ongoing and future litigation, and it gives the NCAA immunity from
See Taking Action, supra note 50.
For further discussion on this, see infra Part V.
113 Unsurprisingly, the NCAA supports the Rubio bill, stating: “[the NCAA] looks
forward to working with Senator Rubio . . . to establish a legislative and legal framework
at the federal level.” See NCAA Statement on Sen. Marco Rubio Bill, NAT’L COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASS’N (June 18, 2020), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/news/ncaa-statement-sen-marco-rubio-bill.
114 Julie Sommer, A Comparative Analysis of U.S. Senator Rubio’s Proposed Federal
Name/Image/Likeness (NIL) Bill and the New Florida NIL Statute, THE DRAKE GROUP 2
(2020),
https://www.thedrakegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/AComparative-Analysis-of-Florida-and-Rubio-Bill.pdf.
115 Justin Sievert, The Name, Image, and Likeness Legal and NCAA Regulatory
Landscape, VELAWOOD LAW, https://velawoodlaw.com/the-ncaa-name-image-andlikeness-legal-landscape/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2021) (noting that the NCAA would
control “any legislation needed to preserve the amateur status of the athletes, ensure
appropriate recruitment, and prevent deals with a third party offered to recruit or retain
an athlete at a particular institution”).
116 See S. 4004, § 2(4)(A)-(B); see also College Athletes Should Give U.S. Senate NIL Bill
a Failing Grade: Criticism of the Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, THE DRAKE GROUP (June
24, 2020), https://www.thedrakegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/DrakePosition-on-Rubio-NIL-Bill-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Drake’s Failing Grade].
117 See Gregg E. Clifton, Florida Senator Rubio Introduces Federal Name, Image, and
Likeness Legislation, NAT’L L. REV. (June 19, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/florida-senator-rubio-introduces-federal-name-image-and-likeness-legislation.
118 Zachary Zagger, Ball in Congress’ Court as States Tackle NCAA Athlete Pay, LAW360
(Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1304852/ball-in-congress-courtas-states-tackle-ncaa-athlete-pay (referencing § 4(b)).
111
112
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litigation covering rights of publicity. The model federal bill should not
provide the NCAA (or any other school or conference) with immunity
from any causes of action. Thus, if the Rubio Bill is passed, the
exploitation of student-athletes will persist, as the NCAA would
continue to “earn billions in gate receipts, sponsorships and television
revenues from college athletic events.”119
C. A (Potential) Reasonable Resolution: Student Athlete Level
Playing Field Act
A third federal proposal, Congressman Anthony Gonzalez’s Student
Athlete Level Playing Field Act (“Gonzalez Bill”), primarily aims to
prevent “a covered athletic association and institution of higher
education from prohibiting a [student-athlete] from participating in
intercollegiate athletics because such [student-athlete] enters into an
endorsement contract.”120 The Gonzalez Bill seeks to maintain the
NCAA’s principle of amateurism,121 prevent schools from paying
student-athletes for use of their NIL,122 and allow student-athletes to
sign contracts with companies that are competitor companies of, or
have business relationships with, their respective schools.123 The
Gonzalez Bill, like the Rubio Bill, also contains an express preemption
clause.124
Importantly, the Gonzalez Bill would create a thirteen-member
commission comprised of current and former athletes, coaches,
directors, and administrators, “whose role would be to recommend
ways for legislators to change the law as the nascent marketplace for
college athletes becomes [clearer] and any unintended consequences

Drake’s Failing Grade, supra note 116.
Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act, H.R. 8382, 116th Cong. (2020).
121 Zachary Zagger, House Bill Would Allow NCAA Sponsorship Pay, Empower FTC,
LAW360 (Sep. 24, 2020), https://www.law360.com/sports-and-betting/articles/
1313480/house-bill-would-allow-ncaa-sponsorship-pay-empower-ftc-; see also H.R.
8382, § 5 (a)(2) (stating that it is “unlawful for a booster to directly or indirectly provide
or offer to provide any funds or thing of value as an inducement for a student athlete to
enroll or remain at a specific institution or group of institutions”).
122 See Dan Murphy, Bipartisan Federal NIL Bill Introduced for College Sports, ESPN
(Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/29961059/
bipartisan-federal-nil-bill-introduced-college-sports.
123 Id. (“That means, for example, an athlete who attends a school with a Nike contract
would be allowed to sign an endorsement deal with Under Armour, but he or she
wouldn’t have the right to wear Under Armour apparel during games or other schoolsponsored events.”).
124 H.R. 8382, § 6.
119
120
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emerge.”125 This oversight committee would provide a powerful voice
for current and former student-athletes and imbue balance into the NIL
quandary. Moreover, the Gonzalez Bill “shall [not] provide a cause of
action pursuant to the Sherman Act.”126 Unlike the Rubio Bill, therefore,
the Gonzalez Bill does not prohibit student-athletes from filing antitrust
lawsuits against the NCAA. Whether or not to provide antitrust
protection continues to be a key distinction between the currently
proposed federal NIL bills.127
D. Beyond NIL Compensation: The College Athlete Bill of Rights
Shortly after the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling in NCAA v. Alston, Senator Booker and Senator
Blumenthal introduced The College Athlete Bill of Rights128 (“Bill of
Rights Act”) to “drastically limit the NCAA’s current authoritative
stronghold on student-athletes.”129 The Bill of Rights Act, however, goes
well beyond NIL rights—it addresses not only student-athletes’
economic rights but also focuses on their health, safety, and educational
opportunities.130
At least two provisions in the Bill of Rights Act warrant attention.
The first is the unregulated transfer provision.131 If an athlete enters
into a professional sports draft—thus prohibiting college sports from
preventing athletic participation—this could lead to an eruption of
litigation and other serious ramifications.132 The second provision
requires athletic departments to share the profit from revenue
generating sports with college athletes who play those sports (after

See Murphy, supra note 122.
H.R. 8382, § 7(c).
127 Compare The Collegiate Athlete Compensation Rights Act, H.R. 5003, 116th Cong.
(2020), and Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, H.R. 4004, 116th Cong. §4(b) (2020)
(providing antitrust protection to the NCAA), with The College Athlete Economic
Freedom Act, H.R. 850, 117th Cong. (2021), and Student Athlete Level Playing Field Act,
H.R. 8382, 116th Cong. (2020) (not providing antitrust protection to the NCAA).
128 College Athletes Bill of Rights of 2020, S.5062, 116th Cong. (2020).
129 Gregg E. Clifton, The Proposed “College Athletes Bill of Rights” Joins Growing
Number of Federal Bills on Student-Athlete Rights, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 20, 2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/proposed-college-athletes-bill-rights-joinsgrowing-number-federal-bills-student.
130 College Athletes Bill of Rights, H.R. 116th Cong. § 11 (2020).
131 H.R. 116th Cong. § 3(d).
132 Details & Ramifications of the “College Athletes Bill of Rights,” LEAD1 ASS’N (Feb. 2,
2021), https://lead1association.com/details-ramifications-of-the-college-athletes-billof-rights/.
125
126
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subtracting scholarship costs).133 But the Bill of Rights Act is vague
regarding its definition of “revenue.” This invites other fundamental
concerns, such as the growing disparities among institutional revenues
and the uncertainty of whether revenue sharing will result in workers’
compensation or unionization.
V. THE TIME IS NOW: A FAIR FEDERAL FRAMEWORK
Although the attempts by some legislators to pass federal
legislation has been well-intentioned and promising, more can and
should be done to protect student-athletes. Specifically, to avoid mass
confusion and to achieve economic equity and educational
opportunities for student-athletes nationwide, Congress must preempt
competing state laws and regulations to create national uniformity. An
independent entity established by Congress—not the NCAA or the
courts—should take charge and pass a law that includes an express
preemption clause and, if narrowly tailored, an antitrust exemption.
A. Express Preemption Clause
Preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause, which specifies that
federal law is supreme over state law when each comes into conflict.134
The Supreme Court recognizes three types of preemption: (i) express
preemption,135 (ii) field preemption,136 and (iii) conflict preemption.137
The only effective and reasonable means to trump the patchwork of
state laws, however, is an express (i.e., outright) preemption clause,
where the federal statute contains a preemption clause that explicitly
preempts all state laws (both existing and prospective).
We need not look far and wide for an example of preemption
language. The ideal federal bill’s preemption clause should mirror the
language in the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA).138 ERISA’s express preemption clause preempts state law
claims that “relate to” ERISA plans under either of the two definitions
posited by the Supreme Court of the United States.139 There, Justice
Harry Blackmun “craft[ed] a functioned test for express preemption,
133 Zachary Zagger, Athlete-Focused Bill Calls for Fed Oversight of NCAA Sports,
LAW360 (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1338547/athlete-focusedbill-calls-for-fed-oversight-of-ncaa-sports.
134 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
135 See Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1480 (2018).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
139 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983).
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instructing that a state law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan if it has
either (1) a ‘reference to’ or (2) a ‘connection with’ that plan.”140
Congress enacted § 514(a) of ERISA to limit plan liability by preempting
claims under state law (including state statutes and common law causes
of action) in order to supplant the “patchwork of state law previously in
place.”141
In this respect, the express preemption clause in the Rubio Bill is
strikingly similar in that it utilizes the language of “relate[s] to.”142 The
Gonzalez’s Bill, however, uses the language “with respect to.”143 As
written, each preemption clause can be improved. Thus, the express
preemption clause in the ideal federal bill should model that of ERISA’s
clause, preempting state laws that “relate to student-athlete
compensation with third parties,” or the like. In other words, any state
law that has a “reference to” or a “connection with” student-athlete
compensation regarding NIL should be expressly preempted to achieve
uniformity throughout the country.
B. Is a Narrowly Tailored Antitrust Exemption Feasible?
The NCAA has been faced with several antitrust challenges in the
past, some of which the NCAA has been successful in defending. In
Deppe v. NCAA, for instance, a punter for Northern Illinois University’s
football team argued that the NCAA’s rule requiring transfer students to
wait one year after transferring to play for their new school was
intended for the NCAA’s economic benefit.144 The Seventh Circuit held
that Division I transfer rules do not violate antitrust laws because they
are “clearly meant to help maintain the ‘revered tradition of amateurism
in college sports.’”145 In Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours, Inc. v.
NCAA, the NCAA changed its rules regarding participation in certified
outside basketball tournaments.146 There, the Sixth Circuit held that the
lower court erred in using the wrong antitrust analysis, and dismissed
the case because the plaintiff sports promoters failed to define a
relevant market.147
140 Plastic Surgery Ctr., P.A. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co, 967 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2020)
(citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96–97).
141 Id.
142 Student-Athlete Equity Act, H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. (2019).
143 Student-Athlete Level Playing Field Act, H.R. 8382, 116th Cong. (2020).
144 893 F.3d 498, 500 (7th Cir. 2018).
145 Id. at 498, 501 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S.
85, 120 (1984)).
146 Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 961, 957.
147 Id. at 963.
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But the NCAA’s attempts to defend itself from antitrust attack have
not always been successful.148 In NCAA v. Board of Regents,149 for
example, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA’s conduct violated the
Sherman Antitrust Act because the NCAA’s actions constituted a
horizontal restraint in trade.150 In Law v. NCAA, college basketball
coaches filed a class action suit claiming the NCAA violated federal
antitrust laws.151 There, the Tenth Circuit held that a restricted earnings
cap for college coaches violated antitrust law.152 And in O’Bannon, as
noted in Part II above, the Ninth Circuit established that future studentathletes “can use federal antitrust law to attempt to ‘prove’ that there
are better ways of preserving amateurism than current NCAA rules.”153
On January 8, 2021, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim
wrote a letter to NCAA President Emmert cautioning him that the
NCAA’s planned approach to regulate NIL “may raise concerns under the
antitrust laws.”154 In response, NCAA President Emmert claimed that
“[the NCAA’s] current amateurism and other rules [were] . . . fully
compliant” with federal antitrust law.155 Many athlete advocates
believe, however, that the NCAA’s current business model surrounding
NIL compensation violates antitrust laws.
Any antitrust exemption shielding the NCAA from liability could
halt student-athletes’ progress and give the NCAA unbounded power to
restrain athletes’ fair market rights. Recently, in NCAA v. Alston, the
148 See Zagger, supra note 118 (noting that, if student-athletes are allowed to
monetize their NIL, this could undermine the NCAA’s main defense in antitrust suits—
that not paying college athletes increases consumer demand due to the concept of
amateurism).
149 Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
150 The Supreme Court defined a horizontal restraint on trade as an “agreement
among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another,” and noted
that this type of agreement is often “held to be unreasonable as a matter of law.” Id. at
99.
151 134 F.3d 1010, 1015 (10th Cir. 1998).
152 Id. at 1020, 1024; see also In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n I-A Walk-On Football
Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (holding that the NCAA is
not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under the Sherman Act for its financial aid to college
students).
153 WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 37, at 29.
154 Steve Berkowitz and Christine Brennan, Justice Department Warns NCAA Over
Transfer and Name, Image, Likeness Rules, USA TODAY (Jan. 8, 2021, 4:00 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2021/01/08/justice-departmentwarns-ncaa-over-transfer-and-money-making-rules/6599747002/.
155 Alan Blinder, N.C.A.A. President Seeks Delay on Vote to Let Students Profit from
Fame, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/09/sports/
ncaabasketball/ncaa-delays-vote-athlete-endorsements.html.
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Supreme Court affirmed a 2020 ruling by the Ninth Circuit, wherein
Chief Judge Thomas held that “courts must continue to subject NCAA
rules, including those governing compensation, to antitrust scrutiny.”156
The antitrust law violation arose from “NCAA members agreeing to limit
how much each school [could] compensate athletes for academicrelated costs.”157 Thus, the question before the court was whether
student-athletes were allowed to receive payments and other benefits
related to education.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that (1) the district court did
not err in finding that the NCAA violated the Sherman Act by limiting the
education-related benefits schools could offer student-athletes; and (2)
the district court properly applied a rule of reason analysis and found
that the restraints were stricter than necessary to achieve demonstrated
procompetitive benefits.158 In other words, all nine justices of the
Supreme Court agreed that the NCAA’s restrictions on non-cash
payments to college athletes related to education were anti-competitive
under federal antitrust law.159
Although it did not directly address the issue of whether studentathletes can monetize their NIL, the Alston decision—and specifically
Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion—illustrated that the Supreme
Court is willing to further erode the NCAA’s framework in future
antitrust challenges.160 As Justice Kavanaugh stated bluntly, “[t]he
NCAA is not above the law.”161 Going forward, if the NCAA attempted to
sanction a college that was complying with that state’s NIL law, that
conduct would almost certainly be seen as a violation of antitrust law
under Alston.
The NCAA has publicly stated that, given the threat of future state
and federal antitrust lawsuits, “the membership’s ability to investigate
and adopt common and adequate solutions to pressing issues facing
156 In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239, 1254 (9th Cir. 2020).
157 Gregg E. Clifton, NCAA v. Alston—The Wait is Over . . . What’s Next for the NCAA,
NAT’L L. REV. (June 22, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/ncaa-v-alstonwait-overwhat-s-next-ncaa.
158 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, No. 20-512, slip op. at 2–3 (U.S. June 21,
2021).
159 Id.
160 Id. slip op. at 5 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (stating that “[n]owhere else in
America [could] businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their workers a fair
market rate on the theory that their product is defined by not paying their workers a
fair market rate. And under ordinary principles of antitrust law, it is not evident why
college sports should be any different”).
161 Id. (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
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college athletics” will be impinged.162 In essence, the NCAA is seeking
the same antitrust exemption protections that Major League Baseball
has enjoyed since 1922.163 But without the looming threat of future
antitrust challenges, it is plausible—even foreseeable—that the NCAA
will remain stagnant and be less likely to voluntarily address this issue.
Furthermore, the aforementioned NCAA antitrust cases
demonstrate that many college athletes would not have received the
benefits and rights they did thus far without holding NCAA bylaws
accountable to federal antitrust laws. An antitrust exemption shielding
the NCAA from liability could halt the student-athlete’s progress and
give the NCAA unbounded power to restrain athletes’ fair market
rights.164 Judicial checks on NCAA overreach in the antitrust realm,
therefore, adequately maintain and enhance the legitimacy of the NCAA.
Additional support for not granting the NCAA an antitrust
exemption can be found in the 2007 Antitrust Modernization
Commission Report165 addressed to the President and Congress. The
Commission asserted that “[i]mmunities should rarely (if ever) be
granted and then only on the basis of compelling evidence that either
(1) competition cannot achieve important societal goals that trump
consumer welfare, or (2) a market failure clearly requires government
regulation in place of competition.”166
A blanket antitrust exemption would fail to meet these standards.
Instead of proving that an antitrust exemption would “achieve
important societal goals that trump consumer welfare,” the NCAA
contends that antitrust scrutiny requires it to unnecessarily devote time
and resources to defend against antitrust lawsuits.167 In almost all of the
NCAA antitrust cases, the NCAA has justified the restraint by arguing
that amateurism is an important value. But a blanket antitrust
exemption is an overly broad way of protecting amateurism. If the
NCAA’s bylaws were not subject to antitrust scrutiny, consumer
WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 37, at 30.
See Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200,
208–09 (1922) (holding that, because baseball competitions are not “commerce,” and
thus baseball is purely a state affair, the professional baseball business is not subject to
federal antitrust law).
164 Exploring a Compensation Framework for Intercollegiate College Athletics, Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. 11 (2020) (statement of Dionne
Koller, Professor of Law, University of Baltimore), (“An antitrust exemption would give
the NCAA unchecked power to restrict athletes’ free market rights . . . .”).
165 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2007).
166 Id. at viii.
167 WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 37, at 29; see also ANTITRUST
MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 165, at viii.
162
163
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welfarism would be compromised. A blanket antitrust exemption, like
the NCAA proposes,168 would likely continue to “undermine the sanctity
of America’s entire free market system and lead to substantial
unfairness to college athletes.”169
Although it is understandable why the NCAA seeks an antitrust
exemption for college sports, a blanket antitrust exemption would do
more harm than good. Specifically, it would (1) cripple the development
of a NIL market that took athlete advocates years to build; (2) leave
student-athletes without recourse moving forward; (3) allow the NCAA
to further reap financial rewards; (4) make it less likely that the NCAA
will voluntarily act; and (5) bypass well-established legal precedent.
Thus, the NCAA could either rewrite its rules to comply with U.S.
antitrust law or wait for courts to mandate such changes.170 Another
option, as sports law scholar Richard Karcher suggests, is that the ideal
federal legislation would include a mandatory arbitration provision, as
well as the right of student-athletes (and the state) to enjoin through
civil action.171 Either way, any viable federal legislation must address
the antitrust issue.172
C. An Independent Entity Established by Congress—Not the NCAA
or the Courts—Should Write the Rules
Another reason why a federal statute should govern NIL
compensation issues is because “judges generally should . . . refrain
from interfering with the internal matters of sports associations unless
exceptional circumstances justify that interference.”173 For example, in
WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 37, at 27.
Marc Edelman, Why Congress Would Be Crazy to Grant the NCAA An Antitrust
Exemption, FORBES (May 6, 2020, 9:50 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
marcedelman/2020/05/06/why-congress-would-be-crazy-to-grant-the-ncaa-anantitrust-exemption/?sh=2a4f4fff70a9.
170 Edelman, supra note 29, at 99.
171 Richard T. Karcher, A Model Federal College Athletes Right of Publicity Statute,
BLOGGER (Dec. 10, 2019), https://collegeathletesrightofpublicity.blogspot.com/
2019/12/drafted-by-richard-t.html.
172 Aimonetti & Talley, supra note 14, at 35 (noting that a benefit of federal legislation
“is its ability to sidestep the purview of federal antitrust law”).
173 Davidovich v. Israel Ice Skating Fed’n, 140 A.3d 616, 632 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div.
2016); see also Ruiz v. Sauerland Event GMBH, 801 F. Supp. 2d 118, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(stating that “[c]ourts generally defer to a private organization’s interpretation of its
rules in the absence of bad faith or illegality”); M’Baye v. World Boxing Ass’n, 429 F.
Supp. 2d 660, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that “[c]ourts generally are reluctant to
interfere with the internal decisions of organizations such as the WBA, deferring to the
principle that courts are ill-equipped to resolve conflicts involving the interpretation of
the organization’s own rules”).
168
169
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a 2016 case, Tom Brady was involved in a scheme to deflate footballs
below the permissible range during the American Football Conference
Championship Game.174 There, the Second Circuit noted that courts “do
not sit as referees of football any more than [courts] sit as the ‘umpires’
of baseball or the ‘super-scorer’ for stock car racing. Otherwise, [courts]
would become mired down in the areas of a [sporting] group’s activity
concerning which only the group can speak competently.”175 Judge
Barrington reasoned176 that the National Football League Commissioner
“properly exercised his broad discretion to resolve an intramural
controversy between the League and a player” in his role as an
arbitrator under the collective bargaining agreement.177
Because courts are hesitant to regulate, or interfere with, the
interplay between athletes and the operation of private sports
associations, it is likely that state courts will be reluctant to get involved
in the NCAA’s internal sporting affairs. This reaffirms the need for a
federal statute to create an independent oversight committee to write
the rules—but it should not be the NCAA.178 The NCAA is too restrictive,
too ambitious with its requests, and clearly partial.179 A practical
solution, however, would be for the NCAA to revise its amateurism rules
and allow NIL compensation prior to each state law taking effect.180 But
this is unlikely to happen.
An independent entity, therefore, could provide objectivity when
neither side’s agenda will dominate.181 This entity could (1) provide bimonthly reports to Congress and explain how the NIL issue is playing
out; (2) set standards and adjudicate challenges; (3) establish caps on
NFL Mgmt. Council v. NFL Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527, 531 (2d. Cir. 2016).
Id. at n.5 (citing Crouch v. Nat’l Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 845 F.2d 397,
403 (2d. Cir. 1988) and Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 536–38 (7th
Cir. 1978)).
176 Patriots fans do not read the rest of this sentence.
177 NFL Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 532.
178 See Maisel, supra note 23 (“[T]he NCAA is run by a board of governors made up
largely of university presidents, a class whose lack of knowledge of athletic
administration is matched only by their reticence to act.”).
179 See id. (explaining how the NCAA has historically been unaccountable as an
organization).
180 See, e.g., Ross Dellenger, Congress Says NCAA Needs Change, But Mark Emmert Does
Not Have the Answers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.si.com/
college/2020/02/12/ncaa-mark-emmert-senate-name-image-likeness.
181 See Jay Bilas, NCAA Stance on Name, Image, and Likeness Amounts to Lip Service,
Half-Measure, ESPN (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/
story/_/id/29113994/ncaa-stance-name-image-likeness-amounts-lip-service-halfmeasure (noting how the NCAA currently has an extremely low reputation regarding
NIL compensation).
174
175
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employment and NIL compensation; and (4) oversee sports agents’
requests and appeal disapprovals.182 It ideally would consist of
approximately ten to fifteen members, including former collegiate
athletes, economists, and lawyers. Each member could be elected for a
term of two or three years,183 and the number of members could be
increased or decreased from time to time through amendment of the
entity’s bylaws.184 This organizational structure would ensure that the
commission would remain impartial and diverse.
The formation of an independent committee, however, might raise
overreaching concerns. The Commission, similar to the proposed Bill of
Rights Act, would likely have the right to investigate, subpoena, audit,
and impose substantial penalties. But the advantages may outweigh the
disadvantages: an independent oversight committee would (1) provide
student-athletes with a meaningful voice; (2) facilitate representation of
student-athletes, colleges and universities, conferences and
associations, and other educational establishments throughout the
NCAA; (3) likely be more transparent than the NCAA; (4) deter
unwanted conduct; and (5) afford a more reliable and authoritative
voice.
Another solution would be for Congress to mandate a federally
chartered, independent non-profit entity (“501(c)(3)”) to set standards
and adjudicate challenges and conflicts. For guidance, Congress could
look to the U.S. Olympic Committee, a federally chartered, independent
501(c)(3) organization, which was successful in its operation when it
passed the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act to oversee U.S.
Olympic, Paralympic, and open amateur sport systems. An independent
NIL Commission would be better than the NCAA because “rights of
college athletes to outside employment are not within the purview of a
collegiate athletics governance organization.”185

182 See Compensation of College Athletes Including Revenues Earned from Commercial
Use of Their Names, Images and Likenesses and Outside Employment, THE DRAKE GROUP
(Aug. 8, 2020), https://www.thedrakegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/8-320-FINAL-Drake-NIL-Position-Paper.pdf
[hereinafter
The
Drake
Group
Recommendations].
183 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.06 (2020) (describing how, in a jurisdiction that
follows the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), a corporation’s board of directors
must serve staggered terms).
184 See, e.g., id. § 8.03 (describing how many directors a corporation should have and
how the election process works in a jurisdiction that follows the MBCA).
185 The Drake Group Recommendations, supra note 182, at 14.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The current athletic landscape and patchwork of state laws
governing NIL compensation require federal legislative intervention.
While the attempts by some legislators to pass federal legislation is
heading in the right direction, the efforts can go further. Specifically, to
avoid confusion and achieve economic equity for student-athletes
nationwide, Congress must preempt competing state regulations and
restore national uniformity through a reasonable federal law. This
uniform federal law should be made by Congress—not the NCAA—and
should include an express preemption clause and, if narrowly tailored,
an antitrust exemption. Until then, states with NIL laws will compete
vigorously for top talent, and national uniformity in college sports and
educational opportunities will be severely undermined.

